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NEW MEXICO DURING THE CIVIL WAR *

By WILLIAM I. WALDRIP
I Confederate and Union Interest in

New Mexico
A T THE outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, it was conceiva.fl. ble that the conflict would have slight bearing on the
Territory of New Mexico, which at that time was a remote,
sparsely populated and relatively little known section of the
United States. Yet the opportunity to acquire potential min-'
eral wealth, military equipment and personnel, and a route
to other richer ter'ritories proved attractive to the Confederate States.
Texas was especially interested in New Mexico, not
only because of the contiguity of New Mexico, but because
of animosities aroused by the ill-fated Santa Fe-Texas Expedition of 1841. Texas had considered the Rio Grande as
her western boundary, and intended, if possible, to make
good her claim. If this were not possible, the expedition expected to open trade with Santa Fe.! The Texans were captured by General Manuel Armijo and unceremoniously taken
'to Mexico City before being released. 2 Although the boundary matter was settled by the Compromise of 1850,3 the
memory of 1841 undo':ibtedly rankled in Texas hearts.
• Master of Arts thesis, Department of History, University 'of New Mexico, 1950.
1. Herbert E. Bolton and Eugene C. Barker, editors, With the MaTeers of Texas
(New York: American Book Company, 1904), in Objects of the Santa Fe Expedi.
ti"" by George Wilkins Kendall, PP. 236-8.
2.' Ralph E. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican History. (Cedar
Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1911-1917), II, 78-9.
3. J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1937). P. 124.
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The mineral wealth of the West was a further incentive
for C·onfederate conquest. Colonel John R. Baylor, a Confederate military leader,-recognized the value of "the vast
mineral resources of Arizona... ," 4 while the gold of California would assuredly be important .to the South which was
cutoff from such precious metals. 5 However, before minerals
from these areas could be made available to the Confederacy,
New Mexico must necessarily be conquered. The North was
not insensible to western gold. President Lincoln considered
it "... the life blood of our financial credit." 6
Aside from metallic ores, there was other wealth in the
West. Secretary of War John B.Floyd1 of the Buchanan
administration· sent vast qUlilntities of supplies to western
and southwestern forts, and New Mexico received its share. s
The suggestion was made to Confederate President Jefferson Davis that
Now might it not be well, secretly of course and at an
early moment, to fit out an expedition to New Mexico. . . . ?
The stores, supplies, and munitions of war within New Mexico
and Arizona are immense, and I am deci<;ledly of opinion
that the game is well worth the ammunition. This movement,
if undertaken soon enough, would undoubtedly have the
effect to overawe and intimidate the Mexican element, which
comprises at least nineteen-twentieths of our population. 9

The South needed manpower as well as money and supplies. Major T. T. Teel of the Confederate forces believed
4. . u. S, War Department, War of the RebeUion:· A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington·: Government Printing
Office, 1881-1901), I, 4:23. Baylor to Van Dorn, August 14, 1861. (The Records hereafter are cited as 0; R.)
.
.5. William C. Whitford, Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War: New Mexico
Campaign in.1861! (Denver: The State Historical and Natural History Society" 1906),
p. 12. (Preface by Jerome C. Smiley)
6. Charles S. Walker, "Causes of the· Confederate Invasion of New Mexico,"
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, 8 :85, April 1933. Citing Latham Anderson, "Canby's
Services' in the ·New Mexican Campaign," Battles and Leaders, II, 691.
1. Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, editors, Dictionary of American Biography,
under the Auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1928-1936), VI, 482-3. Floyd, a former governor of Virginia, transferred a large number ,of llint-lock muskets to southern arsenals to make room
for a new type percussion rille. Although attempts were made, it was not possible
to sell "II of. the older type weapon, thus the transfer. Floyd; until his retirement
from the position of Secretary of War, was a . strong opponent of secession.
8. Whitford, op. cit., p. 26.
9. O. R., I, 4 :97. McWillie to President Davis, June 30, 1861, quoted in letter
from A. T. Bledsoe to General Ben McCullough, August I, 1861.
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that " ... there were scattered all over the Western States
and Territor'ies Southern men who were anxiously awaiting
an opportunity to join the Confederate army;
"10 Baylor
also believed that the South would be able "
to get hundreds of good Southern men, well armed and mounted, who
are anxious to join our cause...."11 To allow for this possibility, authorization was given "... to take into the Con~
federate States service all disaffected officers and soldiers on
the orlginal commissions of the former and enlistments of
the latter."12
Material resources were important to the South, but the
intangible assets of prestige and political advantage were no
less so.. The Union military leadership in New Mexico itseif
believed that "the conquest of it [New Mexico] is a great
political feature of the rebellion. It will gain the rebels a
name and prestige over Europe, and operate against the
Union cause."13
'
A Union leader in reflecting on the invasion concluded
that
the remote and. unimportant territory of New Mexico was not
the real object of the invasion. The Confederate leaders were
striking at much higher game-no less than the conquest of
California, Sonora, Chihuahua, New Mexico, Arizona, and
Utah. 14

However, even if New Mexico was not the main target, its
conquest was necessary if the larger scheme was to be
achieved. Aside from New Mexico being necessary as a
gateway to California it also contained the shortest, easiest,
and cheapest route to the Coast. 15 Too, New Mexico was
bounded on the south by Mexico, the only neutral country
from which the Confederates could gain supplies by land,
and also export goods. 16
10.

Whitford, op. cit.• p. 13.
O. R., I, 4,:135. Baylor to McCullough, November 10, 1861.
Ibid., I, 4:93. Cooper to Sibley, July 8, 1861.
Ibid., I, 9:634. Report from N. M. Hq. to General Halleck, February 28, 1862.·
14. Walker, op. cit., p. 81.
15. Sylvester Mowry, Arizo?l<t and Sonora: The Geography, History, and Resources of the Silver Region of North America (New York: Harper and Brothers,
Publishers, 1866), PP. 223-4.
16. Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Dipwmacy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931), p. 88.
11.
12.
13.
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Although Bancroft judged that -an invasion gave the
Texans, who were primarily involved in such a move, a
chance to display their patriotism,t7 possibly the attempt
wouid not have been made ifthere had not been indications
that conquest would prove simple. As early as September,
1861, Baylor wrote optimistically that "New Mexico can
now be easily taken." 18
One of the primary reasons for this optimistic outlook
lay in the passage of an act by the legislature to protect
slave property in the Territory.19 Although repealed in December, 1861, superficially its passage indicated slavery
sentiment; the law was branded in Congress -as one that
" ... would mantle with blushes the face of Caligula."20
Southern leadership was well aware of the -dissatisfaction among the regular Federal troops because of "want of
pay," and also of the lack -of Union reinforcements. 21 Canby
urgently requested supplies,22 and complained especially of
the lack of funds to pay regulars and volunteers alike. 23 He
cited the "very great embarrassments" caused by lack of
money for troop payments. 24 Complaints were heard too of
-alleged attempts "by secret agents of Texas" to encourage
desertion in the Union ranks.25
Brigadier-General H. H. Sibley, the Union leader who
went over to the Texans, regretted his "sickly sentimentality" in not bringing his old command with him. 26 Captain
Smith Simpson, U. S. A., who doubted if any success would
have crowned such an attempt, _stated that, "I don't think
he [Sibley] tried any missionary work with anybody, for
17. Hubert H. Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888 (San Francisco:
The History .Company, Publishers, 1888) '. p. 686.
18. O. -R., I, 4:109. Baylor to Van Dorn. September 24, 1861.

19. Laws of the Te~ritory of New Mexico. Passed by the Legisw,tive Assembly,
Session of 1861-62 (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Putnam O'Brien, Printer, 1862), p. 6.
20. Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 515.
21. O. R., I. 4:128. Baylor to Hart, October 24, 1861.
22. Ibid., I, 4:65 Canby to Western Dept. Hq.. August 16. 1861.
23. Ibid., I. 4:75. Canby to Paymaster-General. November 18, 1861.
24, Ibid., I, 4:79. Canby to Washington Hq., December 8, 1861.
25. Ibid., I. 4:39. Major G. R. Paul to N. M. Hq., June 16, 1861. However,
Horace Greeley in his American Conttict says that "of the 1.200 regulars in New

.Mexico, one only deserted during this time of trial, and he. it is believed, did not
join the enemy.. n
26. - O. R.,I,

4:55. Sibley to Loring, June 12, 1861.
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there were men who had their opinion on the North and the
South." 27
The Indians were an important element in any invasion
attempt. Bancroft held that the Apaches and Navahos were
factors in the war, not as partisans, but because troops were
necessarily diverted against them. 28 Secretary of the Interior Smith accused "disloyal" Texans of stirring up the
Indians in New Mexico. 29 Whether the above was true or
not, the Indians nortp of the Red River were considered
allies of the Confederates. 3o The ubiquitous M. H. McWillie
suggested the use of Cherokees and Choctaws against the
native population. 31
Finally, the South placed some reliance upon what they
believed was a strong secession movement in the West, which
they hoped to encourage. The Mormons in Utah were depended upon because' of their differences with the Federal
government over polygamy,32 while there were known secessionists in Arizona 33 and Colorado. 34 The native New Mexicans were expected to do their part,35 and Confederate hopes
were so high farther West that Baylor requested that troops
be placed in Arizona, as "California is on the eve of a revolution."36 A soldier with Sibley recalled that a group of
"renegades in California and Oregon" asked that 3,000 Texans be sent to Tucson where 10,000 westerners would meet
them and the whole group
. . . . would' switch off down in and take Sonora, Chihuahua,
Durango and Tamaulipas and add them to the Confederacy.

27. Edwin L. Sabin. Kit Carson Days. 1809-1886. (New York: The Press of the
Pioneers. Inc.; 1935), II, 676.
.
28. .Bancroft. op. cU.. p. 686.
29. Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session. November 30, 1861. Appe;'dix, P. 12.
30. O. R., I. 1:628. Maior E. Kirby Smith to Secretary of War, April 20, 1861.
31. Ibid., I, 4:97. McWilIie to Davis, June 30, 1861.
32.. C. H. Claudy. editor, My Story by Anson Mills: Brigadier General. U.S.A .•
(Washington, D. C.: Press of Byron S. Adams, 1918), p. 106. Mills, in a conversa.
tion with Brigham Young after the war, was told that the U. S. Flag flew over
the temple every day during the conflict.
33. Whitford. op. cit.. p. 27. Whitford held that Arizona was almost unanimously
for the .Confederacy.
34. O. R., I, 4:73. Governor Gilpin of Colorado to Canby: October 26, 1861.
Gilpin placed the number of secessionists at 7,500.
35. Bancroft, op. cit., p. 686.
36. O. R., I. 4:149. Baylor to Secretary of War, November 2, 1861.
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Whereupon Mr. Jefferson Davis commissioned one H. H. Sibley . . . as a Brigadier General, . . . to proceed forthwith
without the loss of time or failure to swipe the whole thing. 37

While the South was aware of the importance of the
Territory of New Mexico and was planning its seizure,
Washington apparently lacked a similar interest, or was
perhaps too occupied elsewhere. Secretary of Interior Caleb
B. Smith, however, wrote to Secretary of War Simon Cameron calling attention to the danger to which New Mexico
was exposed, and also reporting that disloyalty was evident
in the Union army there. 38 The reply, which was not entirely
satisfactory, stated that" ... measures have been or will be
taken commensurate with its [New Mexico's] importance."39
Cameron received further advice when it was suggested to
him that if that i • . . • imperfectly loyalized region of our
country . . . " was to be saved, protection-against both Indians ". . . and the rebellious domestic foe . . ." must be
provided. 40 Smith continued theseefforts,41 but the Territory was largely ignored. 42
Poor communications with the East were further cause
for neglect of the Territory. There was not a railroad or
telegraph within a thousand miles of southern New Mexico. 43 The nearest telegraph, a single wire, served Colorado,
the northern neighbor of the Territory.44 This wire reached
Julesburg, Colorado, in 1861, but was not extended farther
west until the end of 1863. 45 If the East was indifferent
and uninformed, New Mexico too' found herself relying
largely on rumors as to what actually was transpiring on
the outside. 46
37.' Theophilus Noel, AutobioyrCLphy CLM Reminiscences of ,Theophilus Noel (Chicago: The Noel Company Print, 1904), pp. 56-57. ~
38. O. R., I, 53 :490. Smith to Cameron, May 11, 1861.
39. Ibid., I, 1 :605. Cameron to Smith, May 20, 1861.
40. Ibid., I, 4 :53. Perry E. Brocchus to Cameron, July 3, 1861.
41. W. W. Mills, Forty YeCLrs CLt El PCLSO, 1858-1898 (EI Paso, Texas, 1901), p. 71.
42. A. A. Hayes, Jr., New ColorCLdo CLM the SCLntCL Fe TrCLil (New York: Harper
and, Brothers, 1880), p. 165.
43. Mills, op. cit., p. 15.
44. Whitford, op. cit., p. 20.
45. Ovando J. Hollister, The Mines of COlorCLdo (Springfield, Massachusetts:
Samuel Bowles and - Compal)y, 1867), p. 124.
46. Loomis M. Ganaway, New Mexico CLnd the SectionCLl Controversy, 1846-1861
(Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1944), p. 93. Citing
Rencher to Bates, 'June 4, 1861. [Vol. XII, Historical Society of New Mexico, Publications in History.]
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II Confederate Successes
Shortly before actual hostilities began in the East,
Colonel W. W. Loring, a native of Florida, when assuming
command of the New Mexico Depa'rtment for the Federal
government, reported unrest among both the troops and the
civilians. 1 Nevertheless orders were received, in New Mexico
for the transfer of a large part'of the regular troops to
Leavenworth. Lieutenant-Colonel Edward R. S. Canby was
to accompany them. 2
As the North and South squared off for battle, the Territory shared in the alignments of loyalty which were taking
place over the nation. Loring, placing Canby in charge, left
for Fort Fillmore to await action on his request for discharge. a Although Canby assumed command, there were
reports that Frederick P. Stanton, a former acting governor
of Kansas, had received the appointment as commanding
general in New Mexico and was on his way West. 4
Canby, warming to his task, soon began to alert Washington as to the possible danger which the Territory must
face. He reported that
... it is positively known that a considerable force of Texan
troops is now on the march for EI Paso or that neighborhood,·
with the ostensible object of garrisoning. Forts Quitman and
Bliss. 5

A week later a similar report 'was sent, although the attack
was·thenanticipated along the Canadian River. 6
While keeping higher headquarters informed as to the
situation, Canby at the same time warned his own outer
defenses. Major Isaac Lynde at Fillmore was relied upon'
to exert his "zeal and judgement" in .defending his post, and
1. O. R .• t, 1 :599. Loring to Thomas, March 23, 1861.
2. Ibid., t, 1 :604. Special Order No. 86%, May 17, 1861..
3. Ibid., I, 1 :606. Canby to Wash. Hq., June 11, 1861.
4. Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Received (National Archive, Washington,
D. C. Microfilm copy in Library, University of New Mexico). (Hereafter cited as
L. R.) Micro. No. 155, F. M. Arny to Charles E'. Mix, June 26, 1861. Dictionary of
American Biography mentions that Stanton, a former congressman from Tennessee,
had gone to Kansas as secretary of the territory: with~ a pro-slavery ba'ckground.
He later became a Free-State party member, partially because of his dismissa( from
office, XVII, 523-4.
5. O. R., t, 4:44. Canby to Wash. Hq., June 23, 1861.
6. Ibid., I, 4 :50. Canby to Wash. Hq., June 30, 1861.
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also encouraged to attempt the seizure of EI Paso. 7 A short
time later he was advised that " . . . it is positively knmyn
that movements against New Mexico are on foot, . . . "8
Although emphasis was placed on possible attack from the
south, Fort Union to the northeast was prompted against
possible assault on Union wagon trains arriving from Missouri. 9
Granting that valiant efforts were made by the Federal
leadership in the Territory to save New Mexico to the Union,
the number of troops involved was scarcely: commensurate
with that effort. The aggregate reported by the New Mexico Department for the middle of June, 1861, totaled only
2,466,10 although by the end of the year, 5,646 werelisted,u
Realizing that his own troops were few, Canby complained
that the Texans had 4,000 men in Arizona and New Mexico
early in 1862. He further emphasized the need for concentration of troops against any possible attack, while pointing
out that the invader was under no such restriction,l2
The number of volunteers from the Territory itself was
estimated at 1,000,13 but fear was voiced that "our Mexican
volunteers, . . . are far from being certain in a contest
with Texans."14 Because of this doubt as to how the volunteers would react, and inas,ITmch as part of the regulars
were expect,ed to be recalled, a request was made upon Colorado to supply troops for Fort Garland,15
Rumors of a Confederate invasion were not unfounded
as New Mexico learned when Fort Bliss' was occupied in
July, 1861, by Lieutenant-Colonel John R. Baylor. 16 Although the occupation was achieved with little difficulty, a
7. Ibid., I, 4 :45. N. M, Hq. to Lynde, June 23, 1861.,
8. Ibid., I, 4 :51. N. M. Hq. to Lynde, June 30, 1861.
9., Ibid" I, 1 :605. N., M.Hq. to Commanding Officer, Fort Union, June 10, 186110. Ibid.• III, 1 :301. Abstract of Returns, Dept. of N. M., June 30, 1861.
11. Ibid., III, 1 :775. Abstract of Returns, Dept. of N. M" December 31, 1861.
12. Ibid., I, 4 :87. Canby to Connelly, January 21, 18620'
13. COngres8ional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session,' Cameron Report to President, Appendix, p" 16.
14. L. Ro. Micro. No. 160. Collins to'Dole, July 20, 1861. Twitchell in his Leading Facts of New Mexican History says that Canby ,like other American generals
"0 • . had a very erroneous idea of the Mexican character," but was probably inft~enced by "Americans" living there. II, 375, note.
15. O. Ro, I, 4 :53. Canby to Gov. of Colorado, July 6, 1861.
16. Hayes, 0'[>. cit., p" 172.

NEW MEXICO DURING THE 0IVIL WAR

171

resident and loyal Unionist, W. W. Mills, considered that in
El Paso ". . . there was a strong latent Union sentiment
even among the Americans, and with the Mexicans it was
universal; . . . " 17
Baylor, expecting an attack upon El Paso, deCided to
take the initiative, and' with 258 men proceeded toward
Mesilla, New Mexico. 18 Mills, arrested as a spy, from his
vantage point in the guardhouse, observed the leader of the
Texans launch his attack, believing that it would succeed
even though he (Baylor) was outnumbered. 19 On July 25,
Baylor forced Major Lynde, the Union commander at Fort
Fillmore, to retreat from Mesilla, and on the twenty-seventh
was able to capture his entire force. 2o
The defeat and subsequent surrender of Lynde created
a storm of protest from all sides. The Major was made the
scapegoat, although possibly tpere were extenuating circumstances surrounding the whole affair. Mills, who 'was familiar with the Mesilla region, had written, prior to the
Texas attack, to John S. Watts, Territorial Representative,
about the disloyalty of both the military and the citizenry,
and this information had been relayed to the Union commander in the Territory. 21 Mills also had personally told. Canby
of the unwillingness of Captain Lane, Lynde's predecessor,
. to attack El Paso and of his alleged disloyalty. Lane was relieved, and Major Lynde, in whom Canby had a great deal
of confidence, was placed in charge of Fillmore. 22
Lynde adopted a confident manner in his early messages
to his superior. Although doubting a Texas attack, Lynde
reported, " ... but if they do, I think we shall give them a
waFm reception."23 When actual contact with the enemy
developed, this confidence apparently dissipated.
17. Mills, ap. cit., p. 63.
18. O. R., I, 4 :17. Baylor Report, September 21, 1861. Hayes, opo cit., p. 174,
states that Sibley Was ordered to El Paso from San Antonio by A. M. Jackson,
Assistant Adjutant General of the Army of New Mexico, and former secretary of the
territory. Canby believed that the invasion had been arranged by Jackson.
19. Mills, op. cit., p. 62:
'
20. O. R., I, 4 :16. Baylor Report, August 3, 1861.
21. Mills, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
22. Ibid., p. 46.
23. O. R., I, 4 :69. Lynde to Canby, July 7, 1861.
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On· July 24, Lynde learned from a deserter. (sent by
Mills) 24 that the Texans were coming up the· Rio Grande.
The next day the Union troops were ordered to Mesilla, but
the enemy was already on the ground. An indecisive
skirmish ensued, and Lynde decided to return to Fillmore.
He had ordered the Texans to surrender, but they suggested
that he take the town instead. Asserting that the Texans
numbered 700, Lynde placed his own troops at only 380. 25
On the twenty-seventh Lynde decided to abandon Fillmore 26 because of its alleged "indefensible" position, and its
lack. of water. En route to Fort Stanton via St. Augustine
Springs the troops "
suffered severely with the intense
heat and wa:qt of water
" With the Confederates in hot
pursuit, his men in bad condition with only one hundred fit
for duty, Lynde felt that
Under the circumstances I considered our case hopeless;
that it was worse than useless to resist; that honor did not
demand the sacrifice of blood after the terrible suffering that
our troops had already undergone, and when that sacrifice
would be totally useless
I surrendered command to Lieutenant-Colonel Baylor
27

Baylor, in jubilantly reporting the successful pursuit and
capture of the thirst-crazed foe, found that "the road for 5
miles was lined with the fainting, famished soldiers, who
threw down their arms as we passed and begged for water."
With the disregard for accurate figures characteristic of
both sides, Baylor claimed the seizure of 700 by a mere 200
Confederates. 28 In addition to the troop capture, Baylor was
gleeful over taking $9,500 in "Federal drafts" from Fort
Fillmore,29 and the creation of " ... a stampede among the
24. Mills, op. cit., p. 48.
25. O. R., t, 4 :4. Lynde to N. M. Hq., July 26, 1861.
26. Colonel M. L. Crimmins, "Fort Fillmore," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVlElW,
6 :333, October, 1931. Crimmins notes that Fillmore was never reoccupied by the
Federal government.
27. O. R., t, 4 :5-6. Lynde to N. M. Hq., August 7, 1861.
28. Ibid., t, 4 :18-19. Baylor Report to Hq., September 21, 1861. Crimmins in his
"Fort Fillmore" states that hospital whiskey was placed in Union canteens
rather than water. This possibly accounts for the extreme thirst of the Union troops
(p.332).
29. Ibid., I, 4 :157. Baylor to Sec~etary of War Benjamin, December 14, 1861.
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United States troops . . ." at Fort Stanton which was
abandoned. 30
The Union troops involved in the surrender officially
were exonerated as having "proved themselves with a few
dishonorable exceptions, loyal and faithful soldiers of the
Union." 31 It was further reported that these victims of
"cowardice and imbecility" wept "like children" at the news
. of the surrender. 32 The opinion as to the conduct of the
officers was divided. Captain Biggs of the Union spoke of
the unanimous protest which arose when the surrender was
made known,33 but Mills believed that "none, so far as I
know, ... ever did much fighting."34
Although the officers and men were partially or wholly
cleared, the commanding officer for .the Union was roundly
condemned from all sides. The "d--d old scoundrel [who]
has surrendered US!"35 was not deemed so much a traitor,
but more an incompetent. 36 Captain McNally considered that
300 could have held Fort Fillmore against 3,000. 37 Mills ·believed that Lynde " ... was not treacherous, he was weak,
arid he was deceived to his ruin and the disgrace of his
flag."38 Lynde, in attempting to defend himself, asserted
that "surrounded by open or secret enemies, no reliable information could be obtained, and [with]· disaffection. prevailing in my own command, ..." he was helpless to prevent
the disaster which overtook him and his troops.39
This defeat was a crushing blow to the Union cause in
New Mexico. The Texans now had a good' foothold in the
Territory, and Federal prestige had been lowered. To explain the defeat and also to serve as a warning, it was neces30. Ibid., I, 4:19. Baylor to Hq., September 21, 1861.
31. Ibid., I, 4:3. General Order No. 31, August 27, 1861.
32. Ibid., I, 4:11. Assistant Surgeon J. Cooper McKee Report, August 16, 1861..
33. Ibid:, I, 4:8. Captain Alfred Biggs Report, August 6, 1861.
.
34. Mills, op. cit., P. 53.
35. O. R., I, 4:13. Cap.tain C. H. McNally Statement, August 16, 1861.
36. George Griggs, History oj Mesilla Valley or the Gadsden Purchase (Mesilla,
New Mexico: n.n., 1930), PP. 61~2. Griggs quoting Mrs. Lydia Lane, wife of the
Captain, whom Lynde replaced.
O. R., I,
McNally Statement, August
Mills, op. cit., p.
O. R.,
Lynde to N. M. Hq., August
Lynde in corresponding
with Mills in
said that he did ". . . not believe then that my junior officers
would act toward me as they did." Op. cit., p.

37.
38.
39.

4:13.

1,.4 :6.
1891

16, 1861.

52.

7, 1861.

47.
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sary to place responsibility for the loss on the shoul4ers of
someone. Lynde was selected. Canby considered the report
of the Major as " ... in all respects unsatisfactory, .. ."
although he considered the defeat as having one favorable
aspect-the news supposedly aroused the natives from their
lethargy.40
A resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives by the delegate from New Mexico, John S. Watts, requesting that the Secretary of War report the action taken
concerning the St. Augustine fiasco. 41 The Army, however,
had acted and Major Lynde was " . . . dropped' from' the
rolls of the army... ."42
'
Both sides now renewed their efforts after the Confederate victory. Baylor set about organizing a government for
what he termed the Arizona Territory. This area consisted
of southern present-day Arizona, and included much of
what is now southern New Mexico as well. The Arizona region was provided with a military government because of
the war and unsettled conditions, and " ... all that portion
of New Mexico lying South of the thirty-fourth parallel of
north latitude" was incorporated within it. 43
Canby, aroused by the surrender, requested four companies of volunteers from Governor Henry Connelly of New
Mexico,44 and a little later a like number from Governor
William Gilpin of Colorado.45 Washington, although'still desiring the regular troops stationed in the Territory, was
willing to wait until a sufficient number. of volunteers were
raised to replace them. 46 Canby reported that "the greatest
exertions are being used to organize a respectable volunteer
. force, .. ." but that he was disappointed over the progress
that was being made. 47
In the meantime Sibley, who was preparing an army at
San Antonio, was expected to begin his march West to rein40. Ibid., I, 4:2. Canby to Wash. Hq., August 4, 1861.
41. CmgressioruU Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, December 5, 1861, p. 16.
42. O. R., I, 4:16. General Order No. 102, November 25, 1861.
43. Ibid., I, 4:20. Baylor Proclamation, August 1, 1861.
44. Ibid., I, 4:61. Canby to Connelly, August 2, 1861.
45. Ibid., I, 4:69. Canby to Gilpin, September 8, 1861.
46. Ibid., I, 4:62. Washington Hq., August 11, 1861.
47. Ibid., I, 4:3. Canby to Washington Hq., August 11, 1861.
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force Baylor. Baylor, fearing that Canby would soon be
upon him, sarcastically suggested that if reinforcements
were not forthcoming that many of " ... the {riends of our
cause ..." would suffer in :N"ew Mexico, and that "if it is
the wish of the colonel commanding the department that
Arizona should be abandoned, and I presume it is, he can
congratulate himself upon the consummation of that
event," 49
Rumors that Union troops were being massed in Mexico
were further cause for Confederate concern. 50
In November Sibley was ready to start for New Mexico
after many delays.51 The men who left San Antonio were a
hardy group, described by one of the party as
NEW MEXICO DURING THE CIVIL WAR

... three thousand five pundred of , . ~ the best that ever
threw leg over a horse or that had ever sworn allegiance to
any cause. All-around men, natural-born soldiers, they were
under twenty-five, with a liberal sprinkling of older ones who'
had seen more or less service on the frontier. 52

The country between San Antonio and El Paso was
rugged. The Indians too presented an additional problem.
These were pacified temporarily, however, because" ... Sibley's friendship with . . . [them] was very great, while
that of his brother-in':'law, Canby, commander of the Federal
forces at Fort Craig, was nil." 53
By the middle of December Sibley appeared at Fort Bliss
and took command of all Confederate forces in New Mexico
and Arizona. 54 John R. Baylor, ~Jthough outranked,. retained
power as civil and military governor of Arizona. 55
Meanwhile Canby considered that his regular soldiers
were in good condition, but fretted about the possibilities of
ever getting the volunteers into fighting trim and about the
\
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lack of equipment and money,56 However, by the end of the
year, Canby had an aggregate of 5,646,57 In answer to complaints regarding his inactivity, Canby tartlY: said
. . . that I. will move when I get ready to move; and that
will be when I know tnat the country behind me is secured
from a revolutionary movement. The present clamor I know
to be instigated by enemies of the Government, fomented by
emissaries, who have been busy in the exercise of this
baneful influence since the middle of last month, but who
have hitherto. escaped detection. 58

If Canby was not ready to move, Sibley was. By the first
of the year, 1862, word was received that the Texans were
on their way to the North. 59 Canby was faced with serious
difficulties. A shortage of money was creating unrest among
the troops, and desertions were expected among the .volunteers. 60 Revolts did occur at both Fort Union and Camp Connelly because of Union inability to pay and clothe the men
as promised. 61
Governor Connelly, who had married into a prominent
native family, voiced confidence in the 4,000 volunteers and
militia men whom he considered to be " ... under fair discipline , .. ," although he worried about the" ... continual
spoliation of property" caused by the Indians who had
greater leeway because of the Texan invasion. 62 The governor was confident because
The spirit of our people is good and I have here and
en route 1,000 and more of the elite of the yeomanry of the
country to aid in defending their homes and firesides. 63

In February Canby reported that 3,000 Confederates
were moving up the Rio Grande valley, but that he had 4,000
troops ready, and further that "the . . . population appear[ed] to be animated by a very good spirit."64 Additional
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assistance was received from another quarter. James L. Collins, the Indian agent, and the governor were on the scene
to encourage the volunteers because
. . . some doubt has been entertained with regard to the
courage of the Mexican when coming in contact with Texans,
,and we desire to give them every possible incentive to acquit
themselves creditably.65

The natives were credited with having" ... turned out with
'a spirit that is truly commendable, the best and most influen.;.
tial men in the Territory are here and will take part in the
battle." 66
With Canby at Fort Craig and Sibley marching up the
valley, the stage was set for the Battle of Valverde-a conflict which has been termed, possibly in exaggeration, as
" ... perhaps, the bloodiest battle for the number engaged,
in the whole war."67
On the sixteenth of February, the forces led by Sibley
were within a mile and one half of Fort Craig, about thirty
miles south of Socorro. At this point the Confederate general
had a choice of' tactics. He could engage the troops from the
fort, who marched out to give battle, or he could retire
from the scene. Twitchell believed that Sibley was maneuvering at this juncture, so that a river crossing might be
more easily accomplished. 68 On the seventeenth and
eighteenth, a typical New Mexico dust storm halted any
action by either side. The n~xt day the Texans retreated
to the south and crossed the Rio Grande to the east of the
fort where they hoped to bombard Craig from the heights,
but Canby prevented this by occupying the site first. Sibley
then continued north, on the eastern side of the river, to
Valverde a few miles distant. He hoped thus to cut Craig
from Santa Fe and the North. 69
Both leaders presented estimates of the number of soldiers Involved, but were at variance. Sibley stated that the
65. L. R., Micro. No. 170. Collins to Dole, January 25, 1862,
66. Ibid." Micro. No. 170. Collins to Dole, February 11, 1862.
67. Claudy, 0]). cit., p. 73.
68. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican History, II. 374. Bancroft
in his ArizO'na and New Mexico concurs with this, p. 69l.
,69. L. R., Micro No. 170. Collins to Dole, March 1; 1862.'
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Union.had at least 5,000, with a reserve of 3,000 in the fort,
while claiming that the Confederates numbered only 1,750. 70
Canby judged the numbers differently, placing his own at
3,810, and the opposition at 2,600. 71
At the river ford, five or six miles north of Fort Craig,
the actual battle of Valverde (near what was the settlement
of San Marcial) began on the morning of February 21,1862,
when the Union troops marched out to prevent the Confedera.te crossing. 72 A two hour artillery and small arms battle
marked the first clash which resulted in the repelling of the
Confederates. 73 Heartened by this, the Union Cavalry
crossed the river ana engaged the enemy successfully.74 In
the afternoon Canoy took personal charge of the battle and
ordered his artillery to cross the river. The enemy concentrated their fire on the Union leader and
the fighting became general from that moment, and it
was so severe that General Canby was in great peril on
several occasions, and he had three horses killed under him
that day.75

Then occurred the crisis which was to prove the turning
point of the day. Canby, realizing that a direct assault might
not be successful, decided to outflank the enemy,76 but the
Texans had other plans. A Union battery under the command
of Captain McRae had previously crossed the river. The
Confederates with. a desperate, concentrated charge were
able to capture the gu~s and. the supporting Union troops
gave way.77. Canby now decided upon withdrawal, but
claimed that he could not restore order among the volunteers, although the regulars were more easily collected. 78
Efforts to place responsibility for the loss of the battery,
and the subsequent withdrawal of the Union forces, brought
out conflicting testimony. Major B. S. Roberts, who had
70.
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O. R., I, 9:489. Canby to Wash. Hq., March I, 1862.
Sabin, op. cit., Appendix II, 844.
Ibid., II, 845.
O. R., I, 9:490. Canby to Wash. Hq., March I, 1862.
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been in charge of the field for the Union before Canby took
over, believed that" ... the subsequent misfortunes of the
day would not have occurred," if a fellow officer had seized
a position near the ford as ordered. 79 Canby, however,
thought that" ... the immediate cause of the disaster was
the refusal of one of the volunteer regiments to cross th,e
river and support the left wing of the army." 80
'
There were various shades of opinion regarding the action of the volunteers aside from that presented by Canby.
Governor Connelly partially exonerated the volunteers, who
had followed the example of two regular companies which
had refused.to charge. 81 Collins, who was present also, did
not attempt to differentiate between regulars and volunteers,
but thought that the action of both " . . . was shamefully
disgraceful and cowardly." 82 Major Chacon, another witness, in defense of the natives denied that any of the regiment of Kit Carson had been ordered into a critical position.
However, when the order to retreat was given, that part of
the militia which had not participated fled. 83 Twitchell, taking a more detached view, felt that the volunteers were not
all to be blamed for their part in the retirement. 84 Bancroft,
while conceding that the victory belonged to the Texans, did
not wish to blame or praise although he opined that the outcome" ... reflected little credit on the federal arms."85
Although a large number of native troops left for home
after the battle, Canby felt that" ... this adds to rather than
diininishes our strength."86 Washington was informed that
the volunteers and militia could not be relied upon as "they
have a traditional fear of the Texans, and will not face them
in the field!'87 Canby was given' permission to discharge
79. Ibid., I, 9:501. Reports to Major Thomas Duncan; March 8, 1862.
80. Ibid., I, 9:487. Canby to Wash. Hq., February 22, 1862.
81. Ibid., I, 9':629. Connelly to Seward, March I, 18~2,
82. L.· R., Micro. No. 170. Collins to Dole, March I, 1862.
83. Sabin, ov. cit;, Chacon Mss., Appendix II, 845-6.
84. Ralph E. Twitchell, "The Confederate Invasion of New Mexico-I861-1862,"
Old Santa Fe; A Magazine of History, Archaeology, Genealogy, and Biography. 3:35,
January, 1916. Charles F. Coan in his A Shm-ter History of New Merico (Ann
Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, 1928) blamed the failure on part of the volunteers and some of th,e regulars, p. 210.
85. Bancroft, ov. cit., p. 692.
86. O. R., I, 9:487. Canby to Wash. Hq., February 22, 1862.
87. Ibid., I, 9:636. Donaldson to Wash. Hq., March I, 1862.
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them soon after. 88 The governor agreed finally that the
natives would do more for the cause by" ... preparing their
lands for the coming harvest . . ." than in remaining to
fight. 89 Later, in evaluating the New Mexico native troops,
the Rio Abajo conceded that they lacked education and were
not well drilled, but maintained that their discipline was
good, and that their ability to fight Indians well was recognized. 90 Another possible cause for native lack of fighting
spirit could be laid to the lack of consideration and contemptuous treatIl'l.~:i).t meted out to the volunteers by regular
army officers during the training period at Fort Craig prior
to the battle.91
Aside from the matter of' the volunteer troops, Canby
attempted to explain the results of this encounter by declaring that" ... the superiority in numbers ..." and" ...
the superior mobility of its force ..." tipped the scales in
favor of the Confederates. 92 The General himself was not
held entirely blameless, however, although his personal
bravery was lauded. Mills said that
I

'\

I admired General Canby ... , but I believe that if Colonel
. Roberts had been left to carry out his plans that day Valverde
would have been a Union victory and the campaign closed. 93

A later.commentator mentions that many of the soldiers led
by Carson believed that the victory would have been won,
but was actually lost through mismanagement. 94
Another. factor in the Confederate success was a positive
one. The ferocity of the Texans was certainly a contributing
cause. "Never were double-barreled shot-guns used to better
effect," said a Confederate leader. 95 It has been suggested
that this fierceness was due to the great thirst for water
as the Texans had been kept from the river since morning. 96
88. Ibid., III, 2 :4. Wash. Hq., to Canby, April 4, 1862.
89. Ibid., I, 9 :645. Connelly to Seward, March 11, 1862.
90. Rio Abajo Weekly Press, February 2, 1864.
91. Notes and Documents, Letter from Santiago Valdez to C. Carson, NEW
MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, 23 :243-44, July, 1948.
92. O. R., I, 9 :492. Canby to Wash. Hq., March 1, 1862.
93.
Mills, op. cit., p. 58.
94. Hayes, op. cit., P. 170.
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96. Hayes, op. cit., p. 167.
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Sibley praised " . . . the spirit, valor and invincible determination of Texas troops. Nobly have they emulated the
fame of their San Jacinto ancestors." 97 Although his personal inactivity was noticed,98 Sibley said" ... in consequence of severe and prolonged. illness and weakness resulting from it, . . ." that it was necessary for him to retire
early.99 A Confederate soldier had another explanation for
the absence of Sibley. The Confederate leader allegedly was
" ... so much under the influence of liquor that Colonel
Tom Green was obliged to assume command." 1'00
Immediately after the battle a misunderstanding, which
caused some recrimination, arose between the opposing
forces. Sibley petulantly complained that a flag of truce
which his troops understood as " ... a proposition to sur-'
render" was used by the Federals to ease their return to
Craig. The next day the North again availed themselves of
the "generosity and confidence" of the Texans. Oste'nsibly
intending to gather the dead and wounded, the Federals
loaded their wagons with small.arms from the battleground '
and also recovered a cannon from the river. 101
Sibley had a much greater problem. After remaining on
the field for two days to bury the dead and care for the
wounded, rations were reduced to a ~cant five day supply.
There were two choices open-attack the fort or contfnue
north. Sibley decided to go up the river,102 exhibiting little
fear of the Northern troops who were thus left to his
rear. 103 The shortage of food and supplies was evident, and
had been noted at the time of the Confederate advance from
El Paso. 104 The position of the Texans was precarious and
called for action which Sibley recognized, and which
prompted him to move.
Canby was in a difficult position, too. In listing his losses
the Union leader found that 260 were killed, wounded, or
97. O. R., I.oc~ cit.
98. Mills, op. cit., p. 59.
99. O. R.. loco cit.
100. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican History. II. 377.
101. O. R., I, 9:508-9. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862.
102. Ibid.. I. 9:509.
103. Twitchell. op. cit., II, 379.
104. O. R., I, 4:89. Canby to Wash. Hq., January 25, 1862.
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missing. While needing additional troops, Canby and his
men were not dispirited. 105 The Texans did not attack the
fort again,106 so the Northern general chose to remain at
rather thim abandon it or bring on another battle. He decided that he would maintain his position because he was
outnumbered and believed that
If there is any consistency of purpose or persistance of
effort in the people of New Mexico, the enemy will be able to
add but little to his resources from a temporary occupation
of the country.107

At this point Union military fortunes were at a low ebb.
Unwillingness to adopt an aggressive policy had permitted
the invaders to force the ~ampaign about as they wished.
The volunteers at the disposal of Canby were untrained, but
if allowed to fight in their own way, possibly would have
given a better account of themselves. The native population
was unenthusiastic over the conflict, but this could readily
be understood as very few spoke English, and the Territory
had been in the Union for only a little over a decade. Too,
Canby was responsible for defending many points while
.. the Texans had greater mobility, and little liability for the
welfare of private citizens. Defense against Indian attacks
also was a greater problem to the Union than to the Confederacy. Even though granting the greater responsibilities that faced Canby and his officers, the Texans had
gained the upper hand by their greater enterprise, and
were now threatening the entire Territory.
(To be continued)

105. Ibid., I, 9 :492-3. Canby to Wash. Hq., March I, 1862. Ralph E. Twitchell
in his Old Santa Fe. (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Santa Fe New Mexican Publishing
Corporation, 1925), P. 380· remarks that Governor Gilpin of Colorado, upon hearing
of the ·results from Valverde, sent troops to Raton Pass.
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